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This study explores the extent to which changes in age-at-marriage laws are effective in
curbing early marriage and, if so, whether delays in age at marriage brought about by legal changes
increase women’s likelihood to participate in higher education. To answer these questions, we
combine individual-level data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple
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Introduction
Early marriage – defined as the marriage of children below 18 – is widely recognized in international
human rights agreements as a harmful and discriminatory global practice. International governmental,
academic, and advocacy stakeholders have called for countries to establish legislative frameworks that
prohibit early marriage and close legal loopholes that permit marriage below the age of 18 (Human
Rights Watch 2011, 2013; Jensen and Thornton 2003; Walker 2012). The disproportionately high rate
of early marriage among girls compared to boys is also widely documented and recognized by the
international scholarship and community as reflecting persistent gender inequalities (Pesando and
Abufhele 2019; UNICEF 2014) and slow economic development (Vogelstein 2013).
Although not the direct target of a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) per se, reducing early
marriage is critical to achieving the majority of the SDGs set by the United Nations (UN). For instance,
early marriage disproportionately affects rural and disadvantaged girls in low- and middle-income
countries (LMICs) creating cycles of poverty that perpetuate inequalities (Dahl 2010; Otoo-Oyortey
and Pobi 2003). Early marriage also keeps girls in poverty by depriving them of opportunities such as
education and access to paid employment (Delprato et al. 2015; Field and Ambrus 2008; Sunder 2019).
Women marrying in teenage years or younger have little say in terms of when they marry and whom
they marry (Jensen and Thornton 2003) and have low post-marital agency within unions (Crandall et
al. 2016; Yount, Crandall, and Cheong 2018), often resulting in frequent instances of domestic violence
(Hindin and Fatusi 2009; Nasrullah, Zakar, and Zakar 2014; Rahman et al. 2014). Teen brides may
also be unable to negotiate access to safe sex and medical care, leaving themselves vulnerable to health
risks such as sexually transmitted infections and early pregnancies (Godha, Hotchkiss, and Gage 2013;
Nour 2006), which in turn correlate with worse pregnancy outcomes for mothers (Ashcraft and Lang
2006; Fraser, Brockert, and Ward 1995; Ganchimeg et al. 2014; Raj 2010) and worse health outcomes
for children (Efevbera et al. 2017).
In light of the sustained prevalence of early marriage and the array of negative consequences
ensuing from it, there is heated discussion on the effectiveness of policies aimed at curbing the
practice. Changes in age-at-marriage laws have featured prominently among the measures adopted by
governments. Arthur et al. (2018) documented improvements in the frequency of countries to adopt
legal provisions that prohibit marriage below the age of 18, and some research provides evidence of a
significant association between protective laws and lower rates of early marriage (Bharadwaj 2015;
Maswikwa et al. 2015), as well as declines in adolescent fertility rates (Kim et al. 2013). Conversely,
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looking at a sample of 60 countries, Collin and Talbot (2018) found that – despite increases in legal
provisions – most countries are not enforcing the proposed laws, and enforcement is not getting better
over time. These results suggest that renewed efforts to outlaw early marriage may not deter the
practice, even where the incidence of early marriage is declining – a finding that is largely echoed in
Kidman and Heymann (2016). In a similar spirit, Arthur et al. (2018) documented persistent
widespread discriminatory provisions in legislation that disadvantage girls, alongside legal exceptions
to minimum age provisions based on parental consent and customary/religious laws that create
loopholes that lower the legal minimum age at marriage below the age of 18. A systematic review on
legal interventions to curb early marriage found positive results in terms of decreasing the proportion
married or increasing age at marriage in six cases, positive and negative findings in one case, and no
statistical impacts on the proportion married or age at marriage in four other instances (Kalamar, LeeRife, and Hindin 2016). As such, the understanding of the proper functioning of these laws across
diverse contexts remains inadequate.
Despite the complexities of identifying effective policies to prevent or reduce early marriage,
this remains a key priority for scholars and policymakers concerned with raising children and women’s
status by boosting their human-capital opportunities. There’s in fact a rich literature relating later age
at marriage with positive educational outcomes in LMICs. For instance, using instrumental variable
(IV) techniques to account for the potential endogeneity of early marriage, Delprato et al. (2015) found
a delay in early marriage by one year to be associated with an increase of half a year of education in
Sub-Saharan Africa, and nearly one third of a year in South-West Asia, as well as a lower likelihood of
dropping out from secondary school of 5.5 percent in the latter region. Similarly, Field and Ambrus
(2008) found each additional year that marriage was delayed in Bangladesh to be associated with 0.22
additional years of schooling and 5.6 percent higher literacy. Polyakova (2018) found that delaying
marriage by a year in Nigeria was associated with an 8.9 percentage-point increase in the probability
of obtaining some secondary education, and with a 10–11 percentage-point increase in the likelihood
of completing secondary school. Lastly, a recent study from Uganda suggests that a one-year delay in
marriage for women led to higher educational attainment (0.5–0.75 years), literacy (10 percentage
points) and, ultimately, labor force participation rates (Sunder 2019).
Although perhaps implicit in some of the above findings, none of the above studies focuses
specifically on higher education or university-related outcomes. This is surprising, as higher education
is currently at the core of the post-2015 SDG agenda (target 4.3), which aims to ensure that by 2030
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all women and men have “equal access to affordable quality technical, vocational and tertiary
education, including university” (Ilie and Rose 2016; United Nations 2015). Although gender gaps in
education at the primary and secondary school levels have considerably narrowed or even reversed
(Grant and Behrman 2010; Psaki, McCarthy, and Mensch 2018), gender equality in education cannot
be achieved so long as women are underrepresented in participation in higher education, which
remains the case in many LMICs (Ilie and Rose 2016; Myers and Griffin 2019). This renewed emphasis
on higher education is linked, among other reasons, to recent attention to its benefits for individuals’
life-course trajectories and for societies, in ways that are argued to contribute to economic
development, poverty reduction, and societal wellbeing (Bloom et al. 2014). Relatedly, the focus on
gender gaps in higher education also calls for a better understanding of the drivers or root causes of
these imbalances, together with the policy levers that might be adopted to tackle the issue.
Low levels of higher-education attendance among women in LMICs could be related to gender
inequalities in access to higher education, alongside cultural factors influencing perceptions about the
role of women within households and society. In many settings, women are expected to marry and
have children early, thus limiting their opportunities to complete secondary school and/or achieve
higher educational levels (Jensen and Thornton 2003). The lack of recognition of social status of
women other than a wife and mother might imply that the expectation to formally participate in the
labor market in such contexts might be low, deeming participation in higher education not a priority
(Parsons et al. 2015). In light of the evidence reviewed thus far, there is ample reason to expect a delay
in marriage age to increase women’s chances to attend some form of higher education (McCleary-Sills
et al. 2015; Otoo-Oyortey and Pobi 2003).
This study thus provides two contributions. First, we explore the extent to which changes in
age-at-marriage laws are effective in curbing early marriage across six LMICs, namely Benin, Bhutan,
Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Nepal, and Tajikistan. Second, in those contexts where laws prove to be
effective, we further investigate whether delays in age at marriage brought about by legal changes
might boost women’s likelihood to participate in higher education. We do so by combining individuallevel data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys
(MICS) with longitudinal information on policy changes from the PROSPERED Child Marriage
Database. Our findings are twofold. On the negative side, we find significant reductions in early
marriage following policy changes only in two out of the six countries considered, namely Nepal and
Tajikistan. On the positive side, our results suggest that in countries where changes in age-at-marriage
4

laws are effective, women are significantly more likely to attend some form of higher education. In
Tajikistan and Nepal, an increase in the legal age at marriage by one and two years, respectively, leads
to a 20-60 percentage-point higher likelihood of attending higher education.
Taken together, our findings shed additional light on the mixed and highly context-specific
effectiveness of policies aimed at curbing early marriage and suggest that, in order to be fully effective,
changes in laws must be accompanied by close enforcement and monitoring to delay marriage and
protect the rights of women and girls.

Data
We focus on six countries that passed a law increasing the legal minimum age at marriage since 1995
and that have a DHS or MICS conducted after the law implementation (refer to Table 1). We used
the Policy-Relevant Observational Studies for Population Health Equity and Responsible
Development (PROSPERED) database to identify these countries as well as years in which the
respective laws were passed (Nandi, Vincent, and Atabay 2018). Subsequently, searching through other
sources such as, for example, official governmental documents, we identified the month of the law
implementation in each country.
Table 1: Details of the minimum age-at-marriage laws, datasets, country characteristics, all countries

Country
Tajikistan
Nepal
Kazakhstan
Bhutan
Benin
Mauritania

Survey
DHS 2017
DHS 2016
MISC 2015
MISC 2010
DHS 2017
MISC 2015

Date of Law
Implementation
07/2011
09/2002
12/1998
07/1996
08/2004
07/2001

Minimum Age at
Marriage
After
Before
New
New
Law
Law
18
17
18
16
18
17
18
16
18
15
18
at puberty (14)

% In
Union
Before
Age 18
12,3
49,1
7,8
30,6
35,5
35,2

%
Entered
Higher
Educatio
n
19,1
15,4
40,0
3,2
2,4
3,9

Typical
Age of
Secondary
School
Completion
18
18
18
19
19
18

Notes: For Nepal: age at marriage with parental consent; for the rest of the countries: age at marriage in general. The survey
data do not permit to fully distinguish between marriage and cohabitation as they refer to unions in general. We use 14 as
the age of puberty in Mauritania. The average age at menarche, which is a culmination of a process of puberty, tends to be
between ages 13 and 15, depending on a country (Thomas et al. 2001). Since we could not identify the average age at
menarche for Mauritania, we use age 14 as an approximation. Percentages (%) are weighted estimates calculated from each
survey for women aged 20-49. Typical age of secondary school completion is calculated based on the information about
the typical age of entrance into secondary school and the theoretical duration of secondary school from UNESCO
(http://data.uis.unesco.org/).
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In the process of the selection of countries, we excluded those: (i) that had surveys conducted
only among ever-married women, (ii) for which we were unable to identify the exact date (year and
month) of the law, and (iii) that had a survey conducted shortly after the law implementation and thus
provided insufficient information about women who were affected by it. Our final sample consists of
six countries from three broad regions: Benin and Mauritania (Sub-Sharan Africa), Tajikistan and
Kazakhstan (Central Asia), and Nepal and Bhutan (South Asia). The minimum age at marriage prior
to the law implementation differed between the countries. Following the law, women in all countries
are legally allowed to marry no earlier than at the age of 18.
Both DHS and MICS are nationally representative surveys of women of reproductive age (1549) and have similar designs, which facilitates the cross-national analysis. These surveys provide
information about women’s date of birth (month and year), age at first union, and level of education.
We define early marriage as a first union that took place before the age of 18. Using information about
educational attendance, we identify women who entered some form of higher (post-secondary, or
tertiary, or university-level) education. In MICSs for Kazakhstan and Mauritania and in DHSs, the
post-secondary level of education is called “higher”; in MICS for Bhutan it is called
“college/university.” The six countries covered by our analysis represent settings with diverse levels
of early marriage and higher-education attendance, as presented in Table 1. The percentage of women
who entered first union before the age of 18 ranged from around 8 in Kazakhstan to as high as 49 in
Nepal, according to the listed surveys. While only 2% of women entered some form of higher
education in Benin, 40% of women attended higher education in Kazakhstan.
Beyond casting light on the relationship between early marriage and higher-education
attendance, our focus on post-secondary education has an important advantage. Since we classify early
union as a first union before the age of 18 and women typically enter higher education at the age of
18 or later in all countries (refer to Table 1, typical age of secondary school completion), we minimize
the risk that our results are influenced by reverse causality. Our research design ensures the correct
temporal sequencing of the treatment and the outcome, the violation of which is a common concern
in studies of the relationship between union formation and education (secondary education, in
particular).
We focus on women who were at least 20 years old at the time of a survey in each country to
make sure that all women included in our analysis passed the typical age of entrance into higher
education (refer to Table 1, typical age of secondary school completion)
6

Methods
To assess the effectiveness of the laws, we examine whether increases in the minimum age at marriage
to 18 reduced the prevalence of early marriage and, subsequently, whether this change affected
women’s higher-education attendance. For this purpose, we use a regression discontinuity design
(RDD). In the context of our study, this quasi-experimental method is based on the idea that women
who were aged just below and just above the minimum age-at-marriage at the time of the law
implementation are comparable on both observed and unobserved characteristics, and differ only in
terms of their exposure to the law. Relying on the assumption that women’s exposure to the change
in the law is exogenous, we aim to capture the causal effect of early marriage on the likelihood of
attending higher education. The main advantage of this empirical strategy is that it accounts for both
observed and unobserved characteristics that might affect whether women marry early and whether
they enter higher education (endogeneity issue).
The first step of RDD involves establishing whether the minimum age-at-marriage laws
reduced early marriage, i.e., whether there is a discontinuity in the probability of early marriage at the
cut-off that distinguishes women who were exposed to the law from those who were not. Since the
probability of early marriage is unlikely to fall to zero among women who were subject to the new law
(i.e., it is likely that not all women will comply with the law and some will still marry before the age of
18), we employ a fuzzy RDD specification.
Fuzzy RDD is equivalent to an instrumental variable approach and can be implemented with
the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression (Angrist and Pischke 2009). In our case, the outcome
variable is a binary indicator of higher education attendance and the treatment is a binary variable
describing whether a woman married before the age of 18. The treatment is instrumented using a
binary indicator of exposure to the minimum age-at-marriage law among women who were at least 20
years old at the time of the survey. The exposure indicator is described in the detail in the following
sections. In the first stage, we regress the treatment indicator D on the instrument Z (Eq.1). In the
second stage, we regress the outcome Y on the predicted value of the treatment D from the first stage.
The estimate of interest is the local average treatment effect that can be interpreted as a causal effect
for the subgroup that complies with the instrument (i.e. the new minimum age-at-marriage law).
𝐷𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼2 𝑋 + 𝜐𝑖

(Eq.1)

̂𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐷

(Eq.2)
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We conduct and report the results of 2SLS, but our main analyses are based on bivariate probit
models for two reasons. First, our endogenous variable (early marriage) as well as the outcome variable
(higher educational attendance) are binary. Moreover, higher-education attendance in some countries
covered by our analyses is relatively low (refer to Table 1). Since the probability of entering higher
education is close to zero in some countries, the modelling approach that constrains the outcome
variable to the plausible range of 0 to 1 might be more adequate than a linear model that can produce
results beyond these bounds.
Bivariate probit model involves a simultaneous estimation of the probability of early marriage
and higher education attendance. Instead of regressing the outcome Y on the predicted values of the
treatment D, as in the second stage equation, it is implemented as a system of two equations that are
modelled jointly. Similarly, as in the first stage of the 2SLS, in the first equation, we regress the binary
early marriage indicator on a binary indicator describing women’s exposure to the minimum age-atmarriage law. In the second equation, we regress a binary indicator describing women’s education
attendance on a binary early marriage indicator. In such a defined bivariate probit model, the
correlation between the error terms of the first and the second equation (rho) allows testing for
endogeneity of early marriage and higher education attendance.
Apart from the results of the 2SLS and bivariate probit models, we also present results from
an OLS (linear probability models) and probit models that do not account for the endogeneity of early
marriage. For the linear probability models, we report coefficients; for the probit models, we report
marginal effects. In all of the models for Nepal and Benin, we control for women’s religion (X in Eq.1
and Eq.2). These are the only two countries where the religion variable is available. We are unable to
control for other pre-treatment characteristics in any of the countries, such as for example wealth or
place of residence, because this information in DHS and MICS refers to that at the time of the survey.
Using information about the month and year of women’s birth and policies’ implementation,
we group women into those whose ability to marry before the age of 18 was changed by the policy
implementation (“treated”, henceforth) and those who were not affected by the policy (“control”,
henceforth). We create a binary indicator which takes a values of 1 for women who were affected by
the new law, and 0 for women who were not affected (Z in Eq.1). For instance, in Tajikistan the
minimum age at marriage was raised by 1 year (from 17 to 18) in July 2011 (refer to Table 1). We
classify women as treated if they were younger than exactly 17 years old at the moment of the policy,
i.e., if they were still 16 in July 2011. These women were only exposed to the legal age at marriage of
8

18. We classify women as control if they were more than exactly 17 years old at the moment of the
policy, i.e., women who were at least 17 years and 1 month old in July 2011. These women had an
opportunity to legally marry before the age of 18. We exclude women who turned exactly 17 in July
2011, since we cannot determine whether that happened before or after the policy was implemented.
We define the treated and control groups in a similar manner for the rest of the countries.
RDD requires choosing a width of the interval (bandwidth) that specifies which women
around the cut-off defining the treated and control groups are included in the analysis. This bandwidth
needs to be sufficiently large to ensure adequate sample size yet sufficiently small to ensure that control
and treatment groups are comparable. For our main analyses, we present a 3-year (i.e., 36-month)
bandwidth, but we conduct sensitivity analyses with 2- and 4-year bandwidths (i.e., 24- and 48-month
bandwidths). We provide descriptive statistics for the control and the treatment groups as defined for
the purpose of our main analyses in Table 2. Preliminary statistics already suggest that early marriage
was lower among the treated, while higher-education attendance was higher.

Table 2: Details of the treated and control groups, all countries

Country
Tajikistan
Nepal
Kazakhstan
Bhutan
Benin
Mauritania

Age at Law
Implementation
Treated Control
13-16
17-20
12-15
16-19
13-16
17-20
12-15
16-19
11-14
15-18
10-13
14-17

N
Treated
1,233
1,241
1,206
1,468
1,902
1,573

Control
1,146
1,128
1,142
1,462
1,627
1,398

% in Union Before
Age 18
Treated Control
8,5
12,9
45,1
53,1
6,7
10,7
29,7
32,9
36,6
38,7
37,9
35,7

% Entered Higher
Education
Treated Control
23,4
18,4
22,0
13,0
49,8
39,0
4,8
3,6
3,0
2,8
3,9
3,7

Notes: Percentages (%) are weighted estimates. N: number of observations. Treated and control groups defined using the
3-year (36-month) bandwidth, which is the main specification used for the purpose of the analyses reported in Table 3 and
4.
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Results
Effectiveness of changes in age-at-marriage laws
Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the fuzzy RDD specification described above, aimed at
evaluating whether changes in age-at-marriage laws effectively reduced early marriage. Each graph
reports the share of women – aged 20 and above at the time of the survey – who entered first union
before the age of 18 in each country, as a function of the age at law implementation. The dotted lines
correspond to the treatment group, i.e., those girls whose ability to marry was changed by the law,
while the solid lines correspond to the control group, i.e., those girls who were unaffected by the law
implementation. Figure 1 provides evidence of a clear discontinuity only in Tajikistan and Nepal, while
the remaining panels do not provide sufficient evidence – and consistent-enough patterns – to
conclude that the laws were effective in reducing early marriage.
These findings are confirmed by coefficient estimates reported in Table 3. These are bivariate
associations predicting the probability of a girl entering a union before age 18 (dummy=1 if entered a
union before age 18) as a function of treatment (dummy=1 if exposed to the new law). We report
coefficients from both a linear probability model (LPM) and marginal effects from a probit
specification. While the sign is consistently negative in all countries except for Mauritania, the
estimates are only statistically significant in Tajikistan and Nepal. In these two countries, being exposed
to the law reduced the likelihood of entering marriage before age 18 by 5 and 8 percentage points,
respectively. Note that these estimates also serve as the first stage in an IV 2SLS approach, hence the
F-test reported alongside the statistically significant coefficient estimates for Tajikistan and Nepal –
above the conventional threshold of 10, especially in Nepal. Robustness checks with a wider and a
narrower bandwidth are presented in Supplementary Materials Table S.1. The only difference between
the three specifications is that the use of a 4-year bandwidth produces a significant decrease in the
probability of early marriage in Kazakhstan and Bhutan as well. Nonetheless, the sensitivity of the
results to the choice of the bandwidth (statistically insignificant change in case of 3- and 2-year
bandwidths) and the lack of visible discontinuities for Kazakhstan and Bhutan in Figure 1 provide us
with insufficient evidence to be able to claim that the laws reduced the probability of early marriage
in these two countries.

10

Figure 1: Proportion (Prop.) of women who entered first union before the age of 18 by the age at the law implementation and their
exposure to the law, women who were at least 20 years old at the time of the survey, weighted percentages, all countries
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Table 3: Results of the OLS models (coefficients), F-statistics for statistically significant associations
and probit models (marginal effects). Outcome: 1 – first union before age 18 (early union), 0- no first
union before age 18 (reference category). Independent variable: 1 – treated, 0 – control (reference
category), all countries

Tajikistan
Nepal
Kazakhstan
Bhutan
Benin
Mauritania

LPM (Coefs)
Early union

F statistic

Probit (MEs)
Early union

-0.045**
(0.014)
-0.083***
(0.020)
-0.021
(0.012)
-0.029
(0.017)
-0.015
(0.016)
0.016
(0.017)

10.95

-0.045**
(0.014)
-0.083***
(0.020)
-0.021
(0.012)
-0.029
(0.017)
-0.015
(0.016)
0.016
(0.017)

17.30
-

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05
Notes: Coefs: Coefficients; MEs: marginal effects. Control for religion in Nepal and Benin only, as these are the only
countries where the variable is available. MEs for Nepal and Benin are calculated as average marginal effects. Results
without controls for religion are essentially unchanged and available upon request. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level. P-values for Kazakhstan and Bhutan are p~0.08, hence we
report it here as not statistically significant. The main reason is that we need a strong instrument to evaluate the impacts
on higher-education attendance.

Implications for higher-education attendance
Table 4 provides results on whether changes in age-at-marriage laws increased women’s likelihood to
attend higher education in those countries in which the laws proved effective in curbing early marriage,
namely Tajikistan and Nepal. We answer this question by means of a bivariate probit specification
accounting for the plausible endogeneity of early marriage and provide complementary estimates from
a simple probit neglecting the endogeneity issue. For these specifications, we report marginal effects.
The second stage of the 2SLS approach obtained by a simple LPM is reported in Supplementary
Materials Table S.2. Despite the level of consistency across the two estimation strategies – both
suggesting that endogeneity is an issue of concern that ought to be taken into account – we take
estimates from the bivariate probit as our preferred one. As expected, the LPM delivers predicted
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values that are outside of the plausible range, due to relatively low shares of women attending higher
education (around 0.20 or less).
Our results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant effect of entering early
marriage on the probability of attending higher education. A simple probit model suggests that early
marriage decreases the probability of attending higher education by 22 and 24 percentage points in
Tajikistan and Nepal, respectively. Taking the endogeneity of early marriage into account by
considering the role of changes in the laws, these effects are further magnified, as early marriage is
associated with a lower probability of attending higher education by 35 and 59 percentage points. The
results of the robustness checks with a wider and narrower bandwidth are very similar (refer to
Supplementary Materials Tables S.3 and S.4).
Table 4: Results of bivariate probit models (marginal effects), Nepal and Tajikistan

Tajikistan

Bivariate Probit (MEs)
Probit (MEs)
Early Union Higher Education Higher Education
Treated (ref.: control)
-0.048***
(0.012)
Early union (ref.: no early union)
-0.352***
-0.225***
(0.014)
(0.019)
biprobit rho=0.985***
Treated (ref.: control)

Nepal

Early union (ref.: no early union)

-0.097***
(0.017)
-

-

-0.587***
(0.044)
biprobit rho=0.865***

-0.244***
(0.018)

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05
Notes: ME: marginal effects; Ref: reference category. Control for religion included in Nepal (variable not available in
Tajikistan). MEs for Nepal are calculated as average marginal effects. Results without control for religion are essentially
unchanged and available upon request. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the
enumeration area level. The last column reports marginal effects from a simple probit specification which does not take
into account the potential endogeneity of early marriage (for reference purposes only). Results from a simple 2SLS model
– rather than bivariate probit – are reported in Supplementary Materials Table S.2. Results are fully consistent, yet predicted
values are outside of plausible boundaries due to shares of women who enter higher education below or around 0.20.
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We acknowledge that this is a big effect size, yet these coefficients need to be contextualized
by taking some possible factors into account. First, the higher magnitude of the bivariate probit
coefficients might suggest a downward bias deriving from either unobservable and omitted variables
or measurement error in reporting age at marriage or marriage status (“attenuation bias”), which is far
from infrequent in sample surveys (Dahl 2010). Second, and partly related to the above, the high
magnitudes may shed concerns on the validity of the instrument. While there is no a priori theoretical
argument to believe that changes in marriage laws are an invalid instrument for early marriage, this
cannot be tested with the data at hand, hence the claim cannot be ruled out. Third, and perhaps most
likely, it is important to note that the fuzzy RDD allows us to estimate merely the local average
treatment effect on compliers, a special case of the local average treatment effect. This means that our
results should be interpreted as the causal effect for the subgroup of individuals that comply with the
instrument, for whom the returns to later marriage might be larger than average.

Conclusions
This study has explored the extent to which changes in age-at-marriage laws are effective in curbing
early marriage and, if so, whether delays in age at marriage brought about by legal changes increase
women’s likelihood to participate in higher education – an oft-neglected scholarly outcome, yet one
that is central to the post-2015 SDG agenda and is now at the forefront of important discussions
within the international community. We tackled our two research questions using survey data from
six LMICs located in different regions of the world combined with longitudinal information on policy
changes. We adopted simple causal inference techniques to obtain estimates of the causal effect of
changes in age-at-marriage laws on early marriage and educational outcomes. In so doing, we reached
two different sets of findings. The first set of results is rather worrisome and calls for governments
and policymakers’ attention to make policy implementation more uniformly effective. The second set
of findings is encouraging and suggests that effective policy implementation – i.e., legal provisions
accompanied by adequate enforcement and monitoring – may importantly and positively shape
women’s life-course trajectories, hence contributing to raising women’s status within society.
Specifically, we found significant reductions in early marriage following the policy changes only in two
out of the six countries considered, namely Nepal and Tajikistan. Yet in these countries where the
changes in age-at-marriage laws were effective, women were significantly more likely to attend some
form of higher education. In Tajikistan and Nepal, an increase in the legal age at marriage by,

14

respectively, one and two years, led to a 20-60 percentage-point higher likelihood of attending higher
education.
Our first finding relating to the mixed and context-specific effectiveness of policy changes
aimed at curbing early marriage aligns with claims made by Arthur et al. (2018) and Collin and Talbot
(2018) that, despite the increasing prevalence of legal provisions aimed at increasing the legal age at
marriage, the level of enforcement varies widely, and legal exceptions based on parental consent and
customary or religious laws remain in place – alongside high rates of illegal marriages (Collin and
Talbot 2018) – thus preventing the full effectiveness of the legal provisions. Unfortunately, we did not
have data on exact implementation procedures, monitoring, or enforcement, but several sources
suggest that these are serious issues (Bharadwaj 2015; Kidman and Heymann 2016).
Our second finding relating to the implications of changes in laws for higher education is
instead novel in the literature, thus adding to scholarly research on the implications of early marriage
for educational outcomes, typically measured earlier in life (Field and Ambrus 2008; Delprato et al.
2015; Polyakova 2018; Sunder 2019, among others). Also, this literature tends to be focused on subSaharan Africa, India, and Bangladesh, thus making our results for Nepal and Tajikistan informative
and stressing an additional layer of novelty from a purely “geographical” standpoint. As discussed
above, we acknowledge that our estimated coefficients taking into account the endogenous nature of
early marriage are quite sizeable in both relative and absolute sense. While it is hard to evaluate these
effect sizes in light of the relevant literature on the topic – as we are not aware of any study focusing
on higher education as an outcome – we can nonetheless relate our findings to those of similar studies
using changes in marriage laws as instrumental variables. For instance, using an IV approach, Dahl
(2010) found that a woman who marries young in the US is 31 percentage points more likely to live
in poverty when she is older, an estimate that is more than double its simple OLS counterpart. Given
the importance of higher education for women’s later-life outcomes in contexts where higher
education is not widely diffused such as LMICs (Ilie and Rose 2016; Schendel and McCowan 2016) –
relative to, for instance, the US – we are confident that our estimates are not “too big” to be deemed
unreliable. If we considered attending higher education as one effective pathway to increase lifetime
earnings and boost social mobility – shortly, to “get out of poverty” (Kilty 2015; Shimeles 2016) – our
estimates would actually be quite aligned with those reported by Dahl (2010) in the US, thus
underscoring the significance of this educational outcome in resource-deprived contexts.
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Preventing early, coerced, and forced marriage has been on the global agenda for several
decades, first in 2000 with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) highlighting the reduction of
child marriage as a global priority, and then in 2015 as part of the global agenda with the establishment
of the SDGs. We have here argued that SDG Goal 5 – focusing on gender equality to empower all
women and girls – is linked with progress on the elimination of early marriage, yet it is also inextricably
linked with SDG Goal 4 (target 4.3), related to better access and more gender-equal participation in
higher education. Significant progress is nowhere close in either respect, yet a clear implication ensuing
from this study is that better enforcement and monitoring of legal provisions concerning the minimum
age at marriage has the potential to raise women’s status by simultaneously enabling the achievement
of both goals.
We thus posit two clear implications of this research for policy and speculate on a third point.
First, the laudable goal of legislation curbing or banning early marriage must be accompanied by
capacity-building and resourcing for more legal enforcement. Second, monitoring the efficacy of
deterrence, including through exploiting cheap and plentiful micro-level data as we do here, is essential
to test and improve the link from laws to ages at marriage, the outcome targeted by policy and the one
that matters most for women and girls’ later-life outcomes. Third, we speculate on the possibility that
national marriage policies might have a more meaningful impact if part of a comprehensive, multipronged, and context-sensitive approach targeting poverty and rooted social norms in all their forms.
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Supplementary Material
Table S.1: Sensitivity analyses with a 4- and a 2-year bandwidth instead of a 3-year bandwidth.
Results of the OLS models (coefficients), F-statistics for statistically significant associations and
probit models (marginal effects). Outcome: 1 – first union before age 18 (early union), 0- no first
union before age 18 (reference category). Independent variable: 1 – treated, 0 – control (reference
category), all countries
4-year bandwidth
F
LPM (Coefs)
Probit (MEs)
statistic
Early union
Early union
Tajikistan
Nepal
Kazakhstan
Bhutan
Benin
Mauritania

-0.036**
(0.011)
-0.083***
(0 .018)
-0.033**
(0.010)
-0.046**
(0.015)
-0.027
(0.014)
0.021
(0.015)

10.03
22.02
11.42
9.72
-

-0.036**
(0.011)
-0.082***
(0 .018)
-0.033**
(0.010)
-0.046**
(0.015)
-0.027
(0 .014)
0.021
(0.015)

2-year bandwidth
F
LPM (Coefs)
Probit (MEs)
statistic
Early union
Early union
-0.051**
(0.016)
-0.083***
(0 .025)
-0.027
(0.015)
-0.007
(0.020)
-0.016
(0.0197)
0.019
(0.022)

9.6
11.14
-

-0.051**
(0.016)
-0.083***
(0 .025)
-0.027
(0.015)
-0.007
(0.0202)
-0.0157
(0.0197)
0.019
(0.022)

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05
Notes: Coefs: Coefficients; MEs: marginal effects. Control for religion in Nepal and Benin only, as these are the only
countries where the variable is available. MEs for Nepal and Benin are calculated as average marginal effects. Results
without controls for religion are essentially unchanged and available upon request. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level. P-values for Kazakhstan (2-year window) and
Benin (4-year window) are p~0.06, hence we report it here as not statistically significant. The main reason is that we
need a strong instrument to evaluate the impacts on higher-education attendance.
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Table S.2: Results of two-stage least square models (coefficients), Nepal and Tajikistan

Treated (ref.: control)
Tajikistan

1st stage
Early Union
-0.045**
(0.013)

Early union (ref.: no early union)
Cons
Treated (ref.: control)

Nepal

0.134***
(0.011)
-0.083***
(0.020)

Hindu
Other
Cons

-1.304**
(0.491)
0.398***
(0.057)

-0.307***
(0.067)
-0.202***
(0.053)
-0.270***
(0.073)
0.764***

-1.007***
(0.244)
-0.215*
(0.100)
-0.074
(0.072)
-0.164
(0.099)
0.761***

(0.052)

(0.183)

Early union (ref.: no early union)
Buddhist (ref.: Muslim)

2nd stage
Higher Education

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05
Notes: Ref: reference category. Control for religion included in Nepal (variable not available in Tajikistan). Results
without control for religion are essentially unchanged and available upon request. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level.
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Table S.3: Sensitivity analyses with a 4- and a 2-year bandwidth instead of a 3-year bandwidth. Results of bivariate probit models (marginal
effects), Nepal and Tajikistan

Treated (ref.: control)
Tajikistan

Early union (ref.: no
early union)

Treated (ref.: control)
Nepal

Early union (ref.: no
early union)

4-year bandwidth
Bivariate Probit (MEs)
Probit (MEs)
Early
Higher
Higher
Union
Education
Education
-0.045***
(0.010)
-0.347***
(0.013)
biprobit rho=0.987***

-0.228***
(0.017)

-0.098***
(0.014)
-0.617***
(0.017)
biprobit rho=0.951***

2-year bandwidth
Bivariate Probit (MEs)
Probit (MEs)
Early
Higher
Higher
Union
Education
Education
-0.055***
(0.014)
-0.343***
(0 .015)
biprobit rho=0.988***

-0.226***
(0.021)

-0.089***
(0.023)
-0.248***
(0.016)

-0.535***
(0.096)
biprobit rho=0.756***

-0.246***
(0.020)

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05
Notes: ME: marginal effects; Ref: reference category. Control for religion included in Nepal (variable not available in Tajikistan). MEs for Nepal are calculated as
average marginal effects. Results without control for religion are essentially unchanged and available upon request. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the enumeration area level. The last column reports marginal effects from a simple probit specification which does not take into account the
potential endogeneity of early marriage (for reference purposes only). Results from a simple 2SLS model – rather than bivariate probit – are reported in Supplementary
Materials Table S.4. Results are fully consistent, yet predicted values are outside of plausible boundaries due to shares of women who entered higher education below
or around 0.20.
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Table S.4: Sensitivity analyses with a 4- and a 2-year bandwidth instead of a 3-year bandwidth.
Results of two-stage least square models (coefficients), Nepal and Tajikistan

Treated (ref.: control)
Tajikistan

Early union (ref.: no early union)
Cons
Treated (ref.: control)

Nepal
Early union (ref.: no early union)
Buddhist (ref.: Muslim)
Hindu
Other
Cons

4-year bandwidth
1st stage
2nd stage
Early
Higher
Union
Education
-0.036**
(0.011)
-1.895**
(0.665)
0.122***
0.450***
(0.010)
(0.069)
-0.083***
(-0.018)
-1.186***
(0.246)
-0.287***
-0.250*
(0.062)
(-0.099)
-0.186***
-0.093
(0.051)
(0.075)
-0.257***
-0.210*
(0.069)
(0.102)
0.737***
0.865***
(0.051)
(0.178)

2-year bandwidth
1st stage
2nd stage
Higher
Early Union
Education
-0.051**
(0.016)
-1.271*
(0.503)
0.139***
0.383***
(0.014)
(0.059)
-0.083**
(0.025)
-0.696**
(0.236)
-0.276**
(-0.111)
(0.086)
(0.097)
-0.150*
0.016
(0.068)
(0.064)
-0.276**
-0.093
(0.090)
(0.098)
0.714***
0.504**
0.068
(0.168)

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, *p<0.05
Notes: Ref: reference category. Control for religion included in Nepal (variable not available in Tajikistan). Results
without control for religion are essentially unchanged and available upon request. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the enumeration area level.
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